Musings on research, international development and other stuff

12 principles for Payment by Results – the simplified version



Meanwhile in Oxford…

Stefan Dercon and Paul Clist recently published this excellent short paper outlining 12 principles to consider before using a Payment by Results (PbR) contract for development programmes. But, as pointed out by @hmryder, it is written in quite technical language. You can’t blame the authors – I mean, they are hardcore economists who probably speak that way when they are watching the football. So I have attempted to translate the paper for fellow simple folk – economists do let me know if I have made any mistakes.

Principle 1: PbR involves paying for something after it has been delivered. Therefore it only works if the implementer has enough money in the first place to pay for the work until they are reimbursed.

Principle 2: If you are going to pay based on results, you need to be able to measure the results. If you choose a proxy indicator (i.e. not the final result you are looking for but something that has to change along the way), you need to make sure that changes in your indicator really suggest that the end result will change too.

Principle 3: Some people will game the system by finding ways to make it seem that they have achieved the results when they actually haven’t. Perhaps more worrying is that if you choose the wrong proxy indicator, it might lead people to concentrate too much on trying to achieve that without trying to achieve the actual end result you are looking for.

Principle 4: Donors shouldn’t use PbR just as a way to reduce their risk, for two reasons. Firstly, donors are actually usually much better able to handle risk than implementing partners. This is because donors tend to be funding lots of projects, so if one or two go wrong, they still know they have others that should work. Implementers, on the other hand, may only have one project so they are likely to be really risk averse. The second reason is that the implementer is already likely to be very susceptible to risk and by transferring the additional risk of potential non-payment, you will probably just make them even more risk averse.

Principle 5: If the thing that you want to achieve is essentially the same as the thing the implementer wants to achieve, PbR may not be that useful. PbR should be used to incentivise implementers to do the thing that you want them to do, and you might be wasting effort if they are already fully incentivised to do that thing anyway.

Principle 6: PbR is useful where it is difficult to measure what the implementers are doing (inputting), and therefore you need to measure what they are achieving. If you can easily measure what they are doing, just do that.

Principle 7: PbR works well when achieving the result you are looking for is actually within the control (more or less) of the implementers. It doesn’t work well when there are loads of factors outside the implementers control which will determine whether the result is achieved.

Principle 8: The biggest extra cost of PbR contracts compared to other contracts is the cost of verifying whether results (or a suitable proxy indicator of results) have been achieved.

Principle 9: There is some evidence that trying to incentivise people who are already very motivated to do something by giving them money can actually backfire – they may feel insulted that you think they need to be paid to do something when actually they want to do it because they think it is the right thing. (I wrote about this a bit here).

Principle 10: Donors need to be honest about the practical constraints they are working under and to be aware when these might get in the way of an effective PbR contract.

Principle 11: You can only judge whether your PbR contract has been sucessful by looking to see whether the end result you were aiming for has actually been achieved. Just showing that a proxy indicator has been achieved is not enough.

Principle 12: Remember that PbR is not the only tool in the box for incentivising performance.



6 thoughts on “12 principles for Payment by Results – the simplified version

  1. Fabulously straightforward language and the principles make a lot of sense – thanks very much, to you and the original authors!

  2. Great blog. I wonder how many. Of these principles could also be applied to performance related pay in the civil service?

  3. Enjoyed the translation – you explained the principles really well. Thanks.

  4. Excellent and helpful summary for which I thank you. One remark: proxy indicator is an redundancy, indicators are proxies, i.e. you use an indicator when you cannot observe directly the construct you are interested in. Cheers, Ian Davies

  5. Thanks for this – very useful summary, and an example I’m going to share with others of great translation of techy stuff.

Leave a Reply (go on, you know you want to...)

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s